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The Quest for Correctness
H.P. Ba rend regt
Die Genauigkc.it, Kraft und Sicherheit dieses [mathematischen] Denkens, die nir- 
gends im Leben ihresgleichen hat, erfüllte ih m fa st m it Schwermut. (The precision, 
strength and certainty of this [mathematical] thinking, tha t is unequaled in life, 
almost pervaded him with melancholy. R. Musil: The m an w ithout qualities, Cli.
28.)
R. M usil [13]: Der Maun ohne Eigenscliaften.
1. S u m m a r y
Modern society lias a strong need for reliable information technology (IT). 
To warrant correct designs for hardware and software systems, there is a 
thorough methodology (specification, design based on subspecifications and 
composition of components, and correctness proofs). Because of the diffi­
culty of making specifications and proofs, the success of this method has 
been only partial, mainly in the area of hardware design.
Presently a new technology is emerging: computer mathematics. It con­
sists of the interactive building of definitions, statements and proofs, sucli 
that it can be checked automatically whether the definitions are well-formecl 
and the proofs are correct. Hereby the human user provides the intelligence 
and the system does part of the craftsmanship. Some forms of computer 
mathematics are already of use for the design of hardware systems. After 
the technology has matured, it may become a tool for the development of 
mathematics comparable to systems of computer algebra, but with a scope
H.P. B arendregt
and strength that is essentially beyond. Moreover, it probably will also be 
useful for the design of reliable software.
2. T h e  p r o b l e m
Once upon a time, money was by convention a substitute for gold. Rather 
than exchanging goods with goods or exchanging goods with gold it was 
more practical to exchange goods with moiiey. The gold that was available 
in exchange for the otherwise worthless coins or paper notes was stored in 
banks. The central bank of the most powerful country had its reserve of 
gold stored in a well-protected place: Fort Knox. Only powerful criminals 
or James Bond (with the aid of pretty girls) could enter such a place. About 
25 years ago the link between money and gold was abandoned: since then 
money stands for itself. As a consequence Fort Knox lost its importance. 
Moreover, the flow of cash has been drastically reduced by means of several 
forms of electronic payment, and therefore possession has become equivalent 
to the right sequence of bits in some central computer of a bank. Even in a 
relatively peaceful country as The Netherlands such computers are stored 
in bunkers surrounded by a defense moat against tanks. But the Janies 
Bond of today or tomorrow will not need force or women to enter these 
places. Computer hacking using external connections makes the new Fort 
Knox vulnerable. Perhaps external connections can be limited or avoided 
(but what then is the use of a central computer?). There is, however, a more 
serious problem: the software of the central computer may be ill-designed 
(by accident or 0 11 purpose). Well-informed sources in the banking world 
admit that this is indeed a very worrisome danger. (The daily flow of money 
through computer networks is about US$ 1012. Whereas in an average 
conventional bank robbery a couple of US$ 1,000 is stolen, in an average 
computer bank robbery one does catch US$ 1,000,000. The frequency of 
these successful crimes, made possible by system design flaws, is classified 
information.
More examples can be given of the importance of correct systems. Simple 
products such as electric razors carry their own microprocessors and soft­
ware. The manufacturers do not want to have bugs in these systems for 
obvious reasons. A more striking example is the following. Well-informed 
sources of a large airline company have stated that ‘just 24 hours of fail­
ure of our worldwide reservation system will cause bankruptcy’, because 
of missed orders. Even more important is the correctness of systems on 
which the safety of people depend: for example for the control of factories 
or air-traffic, or for medical or military applications.
These examples all show that correct systems—both the hardware and 
the software—are essential for the survival of a company. It is fair to state, 
that in this digital era correct systems for information processing are more 
valuable than gold. The remarkable thing is that in spite of our techno-
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Figure 1. Correct software and hardware is of vital importance in many real-life situa­
tions, for example in air traffic reservation systems. Photo's Capital Press.
logically advanced hardware, we still are by and large in the stone-age of 
software. By this is meant that it is very hard to produce correct software 
or predict the time it takes to produce it.
3. D e s i g n  m e t h o d o l o g y
Part of the problem is that the needed systems are very complex. Iiow can 
one correctly design a system with millions of transistors or consisting of 
millions of lines of program code?
3.1. T he Chinese box
A proposed solution is the following. The method is well-known, but usually 
not explicitly described. Given the task to construct a system, one should 
first transform the informal requirements into a more precise (formal) spec­
ification. Then one designs the system accordingly. Finally, one proves that 
the design satisfies the given specification. For this the specification and 
the design need to be formulated in one language.
This is an ambitious programme; it works only if the following items are 
available with full precision:
1. an expressive but intuitively understandable specification language;
2. an expressive design language with good tools to combine modules 
together;
3. a tool to verify proofs of formal statements.
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Figure 2, Design methodology.
If these three conditions are satisfied, then one can use the following con­
struction methodology. Given a specification S, one wants to make a design 
d, such that one can verify
S(d),
i.e., that the program satisfies the specification. This can be done by pro­
viding
• specifications 5 i , . . . ,  S^; 
a constructor F;
• a proof of the following statement (where the d\ , . . , ,  dn are arbitrary)
S1(di )b. . .bSk(dk) =* S(F(du . . . ,dk)).
So the problem of constructing d satisfying S is transformed into the k 
(easier) problems of constructing di, . . . ,d/.  satisfying respec­
tively.
If these d\ , ... ,d/. are available, then the required d can be found: 
cl F[d\ , . . . ,  dfo'),
Figure 3. The Chinese box.
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see figure 2. In order to find now the di , . . . ,  d ,^ the method is applied again 
to S i , . . . , Sk', and so on. In this way we obtain a ‘Chinese box’ containing 
several boxes, each in turn containing other boxes, etcetera, see figure 3. 
An example of this is the following. Suppose we want a music reproducing 
device of high quality. This can be specified by stating that the difference 
between the actual sound and the reproduced sound is small (according to 
some appropriate measure). One way to obtain such a device is to buy a CD- 
player, a CD, an amplifier, boxes and wires, to have a current outlet, and 
then make the right connections. Each of the components can be specified. 
Now to obtain e.g. an amplifier, one needs a transformer, integrated circuits, 
etcetera, and make the right connections. In order to obtain a transformer, 
one needs a magnet, wire, etcetera. Etcetera.
The example not only shows that designing is a refined job, but also that 
making precise specifications is important as well. For example the CD 
should contain stored music according to a fixed coding scheme, otherwise 
the CD player cannot be constructed.
Of course the method has to be ‘well-founded’: the smallest boxes should 
not be empty. Indeed, for the design of software the smallest boxes will have 
to contain programs provided by the instruction set of the processor. These 
processors can be constructed following a similar design methodology for 
hardware out of smaller boxes. In the end Nature provides the final step: 
electrons in circuits that do their work.
3.2. Partial success
The design methodology given above is very general. It can be applied to 
many situations, in which complicated ‘objects’ have to be constructed. In 
the area of IT it has provided a partial success for the construction of verified 
hardware. For more than a decade hardware design has been done according 
to the scheme specification/design/proof. The reason for this success is that 
hardware is relatively simple, being comparable to propositional logic. In 
this mathematical theory one can state and prove, for example, that ‘B and 
A or not B implies A’, in symbols
(B&(AV -B)) =* A. (*)
Here the objects of interest are easy to specify as Boolean functions. More­
over, propositional logic is decidable. That is, proofs of correct statements 
can be generated automatically.
This description, however, is a simplification. For two reasons the situ­
ation with hardware design is more interesting. In the first place propo­
sitional logic, in spite of being decidable, is related to problems of high 
complexity (NP-complete and NP-hard). Methods like Binary Decision Di­
agrams have been developed to overcome this difficulty, making it possible
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to deal with propositions witli large numbers of variables (> 100, and not 
just 2 as in (*)). Secondly, hardware is somewhat more complicated than 
propositional logic. This is caused on the one hand by real-time aspects of 
circuits, and on the other hand by multiple repetitions of patterns that can 
better be treated in a more powerful theory. As a result the theory and 
practice of hardware verification is a flourishing field (see T.F. Melham et 
al. [12]).
3.3. A challenge
Also in the area of software design there have been efforts to prove correct­
ness. But here matters are essentially more difficult. Software corresponds 
to predicate logic, with statements like ‘there exists an x such that for all 
y one has x < y implies that for all y there exists an x such that x < i/’; in 
symbols
SxMy.x <V => 'iy-^x.x < y.
The difficulty is that the so-called quantifiers ‘for all’ and ‘there exists’ range 
over potentially infinite sets, and therefore it comes as no surprise, that this 
theory is undecidable.
Hardware ~  propositional logic (decidable)
Software ~  predicate logic (undecidable)
Another problem is to find the right granularity. The first introduction 
of correctness proofs in program design, by Hoare, was in connection with 
imperative programs in which continually a given state (the values of the 
variables) is modified. By formulating a suitable property of the state and 
proving that it is invariant under the modifications of the program, correct­
ness proofs can be given. At that time this method was definite progress. 
But the method is of a granularity that is too fine to prove that large soft­
ware systems are correct.
New programming paradigms such as functional programming, (see e.g. 
R. Plasmeijer and M. van Eekelen [18] or D. Pountain [19]), possibly includ­
ing object-oriented features, may become a good design tool to overcome 
this difficulty by using the methodology of the Chinese box. Software design 
still lacks a good language for specification and the right tools for correctness 
proofs. This is one of the reasons, why we still are in the software crisis. In 
the next section we will discuss systems of so-called computer mathematics 
that may very well change this situation.
4. C o m p u t e r  m a t h e m a t ic s
Because computer mathematics (CM) is a relatively new technology, present­
ly in its second generation of prototypes, there is not yet a standard name
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for it. Alternative names are: ‘systems for proof development’, ‘systems 
for theory development’ and ‘interactive theorem provers’. We have chosen 
the name ‘computer mathematics’ because of the analogy with systems for 
computer algebra (CA).
4-1. What is computer m a th em a tic s?
It is well-known that computers perform numerical computations. Since the 
1960s systems for computer algebra have been developed, that can represent 
exactly numbers like \Jt\ and perform symbolic computations quite well. 
(However, since several systems of CA state for example that ( \ / x ) 2 =  x  
without requiring that x  > 0, the diligent judgement of a mathematician 
remains necessary.)
Systems for computer mathematics go an essential step beyond this. They 
can deal with arbitrary mathematical notions. For example, it is possible in 
these systems to represent exactly a Hilbert space or more complex m ath­
ematical structures. This is possible because one can formulate statements 
involving quantifiers (V, 3) and predicates. CM systems also provide sup­
port for mathematical reasoning, for example by m anipulating complex ex­
pressions. One fundamental difference between equational reasoning (both 
numerical and symbolic) and reasoning with predicates is that in many cases 
the former is decidable, whereas the latter usually is not. For this reason 
systems of computer mathematics are interactive, whereby the mathemati­
cian takes the lead.
Before going into more detail we first want to  mention three important 
contributions of the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) to the field 
of computer mathematics. He established the following.
Description of the axiomatic m ethod
Aristotle distinguished concepts and p ropos i t ion s .  Concepts need to be de­
fined and propositions need to be proved. (A p ro o f  is a sequence of state­
ments, such that each one is either an axiom or follows from previous ones 
by reason. A proof p  is proving A ,  if A  is the last statem ent in the sequence 
p. The discovery of proofs, attributed to Thales (625-545 B.C.), is one of the 
greatest inventions of humanity. They occur in various degrees of precision 
(depending 011 the refinedness of the statements and the reasoning) and are 
the main foundation for the reliability of science.) But in order to have a 
proper start one needs p r im i t iv e  concepts  and prim itive propositions, the 
so-called axioms. Not much later Euclid (around 300 B.C.) carefully based 
his famous book Elem ents  on this axiomatic method.
Formulation of the quest for logic
Using the axioms, and primitive and defined concepts, one can prove propo­
sitions by means of steps motivated by intuitive reasoning. Aristotle wanted
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to provide a set of explicit rules (sy l log ism s), that is powerful enough for 
most intuitively valid proofs. Although his teacher Plato (427-347 B.C.) 
was against this programme, Aristotle succeeded partially, by singling out 
a correct (but incomplete) set of syllogisms. But more important was, th a t 
Aristotle had the courage to state the problem of formalising reason.
Distinction between proof-checking and theorem  proving
Aristotle said, that if someone showed him a proof of a statement, then he 
would be able to verify the correctness of that proof (and thereby of th a t 
statement relative to the axioms). If, however, he would be asked to prove 
a given theorem (of which a proof existed, but that was not given to him), 
then he would not always be able to  do so.
The philosopher and mathematician 
G.W. Leibniz (1646-1717) went fur­
ther, by expecting more from for­
malisms and machines. He wanted 
to construct
• a language L, in which arbitrary 
problems could be formulated;
• a machine, that could determine 
the correctness of statements in L .  
(It is interesting that around 1700 
the belief in machines was such, 
that Leibniz had in mind to ask as 
first question: ‘Does God exist?’)
But, as was hinted at by Aristotle 
(and proved later by Turing), such 
automated deduction is in general not possible. An actual system of com­
puter mathematics (like LEGO or Coq) is less powerful than Leibniz would 
have wanted. It consists of a user interface in which the user can construct 
a so-called (mathematical) context:
• primitive notions, axioms and defined notions; 
furthermore one can formulate
• statements;
and for some of these statem ents one can construct interactively
• proofs.
Figure 4. G.W. Leibniz.
The computer will verify whether the definitions are well-formed and 
whether the proofs are correct. Such definitions and proofs need to be
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given in a fully formal way, otherwise they cannot be verified mechanically. 
A fully formal proof is called a proof-object.
It is clear, how much this technology is related to the three ideas of Aris­
totle. His programme to find a complete system of logic, was completed by
G. Frege (in 1879, more than 2200 years after the original quest), building 
upon work of Leibniz, Boole and Peirce. (Frege did start with the formalisa­
tion of some mathematics, but unfortunately used an inconsistent system of 
mathematical axioms.) Soon after, B. Russell and N. Whitehead gave a fully 
formalized version of small fragments of consistent mathematics (Principia 
Mathematica, 1910). This work formed the basis of the fundamental results 
stating that arithmetic is essentially incomplete (K. Godel, 1931) and un- 
decidable (A. Turing, 1936). In practice, however, Russell and Whitehead’s 
system is not adequate for full formalization, because the system does not 
contain names, which causes actual theories to become unfeasibly large; 
moreover, there is a need for substitution instances of theorems, which in 
Principia were indicated informally.
The idea of machine verified proofs originated with the Dutch mathe­
matician N.G. de Bruijn, who in 1968 designed for this purpose a family 
of languages generically called Automath (see Nederpelt et al. [14]). In­
spiration for this came from the meaning of the logical connectives, as put 
forward by L.E.J. Brouwer and A. Heyting. The ideas are also related to 
work of Gentzen, Church and Howard (see figure 5, subsection 4.3). R. Boyer 
pointed out to me that also in McCarthy [11] automated proof-checking was 
considered. In fact McCarthy’s paper is rather close to the present paper. 
An essential difference is that the use of type theory (see below) and natural 
deduction proofs is not discussed by him.
As was pointed out by Aristotle proof search is essentially more difficult 
than proof-checking. By the definition of proof, automated proof verification 
is always possible, while automated deduction is not. Nevertheless, for 
special areas of interest there are good systems for automated deduction. 
For example, the geometry prover of Cliou and Wu (see Bundy [4], p. 393), 
can derive automatically Morley’s theorem concerning triangles in which 
the three angles are trisected. But this is a statement in a decidable theory. 
Another example is concerned with predicate logic. Although this theory is 
undecidable, one can derive automatically a class of tautologies of predicate 
logic, that are more difficult than those used in most mathematical texts.
In spite of the remark of Aristotle that proof-checking is different from 
theorem proving, systems for CM usually incorporate both. The reason 
is that in a pure proof-checker it is very boring to write down a formal 
proof. On the other hand general theorem proving is impossible. Usually 
one needs to give a sequence of lemmas to the system, before it can prove 
an interesting result. So there is a spectrum between proof-checkers and 
theorem provers.
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a system of CM this can be done. But the help of such a system consists 
in verifying the well-formedness of definitions and the correctness of proofs. 
Moreover, the systems keep a record of those details that are still left out. 
Another support by systems of CM consists ill generating formal proofs 
from so-called tactics, to be discussed in the next subsection.
Program  extraction
If a statement of the form ‘\fx3y . . . ’ is proved, then this often gives rise to 
an algorithm that finds the y in terms of i .  If the proof is given formally, 
then the algorithm can be extracted automatically in the form of a program, 
see e.g. Parent [15].
Education
As it is a fact, that in several ‘civilised’ countries the notion of proof is not 
taught anymore at higli-school level, it becomes necessary that university 
students of mathematics, science and technology get acquainted with them 
as soon as possible. Interactive systems for proof development will be of 
definite help, notably because such systems are patient. Moreover, the 
proofs can be found only, if one understands what one is doing.
Cultural value
Suppose, that with the support of a CM system writing verified mathematics 
is not much more difficult than writing an intuitively correct paper in TeX, 
then a new standard of precision may emerge. By building a library of 
verified results, mathematics may be protected against corruption in times 
that the subject is not cultivated anymore (as essentially happened in the 
Middle Ages). In Bundy [4], pp. 238-251, a dramatic but non-Utopian 
plea for building such a library is formulated as the QED manifesto. One
quotation: ‘[building such a library is] of significant cultural character.......
Like the great pyramids, the effort required (especially early on) may be 
great; but the rewards can be even more staggering than this effort’.
Foundational interest
It is an interesting challenge to see, whether it is possible to build systems 
of CM, such that it does not require too much effort to construct proof- 
objects. In this respect De Bruijn has as thesis, that in a proper system of 
CM the length of a formal proof or required tactics is just a constant factor 
times the length of a complete intuitive proof. Experience so far is in favour 
of this thesis. For the first generation prototypes the factor is about 30; for 
the second generation that uses tactics it is about 10. Also it is of interest 
to study, in which class of formal systems proofs can be well represented 
(set theories vs. type theories, other systems).
There may be a methodological objection to the idea of computer verifica­
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tion. If a mathematical statement is verified for its correctness by a com­
puter, are we willing to believe that statement? There could be a mistake 
in the design of the verifying program.
This question has a satisfactory answer. If the verification is warranted by 
aproof-object that is made public and that is verifiable by a relatively simple 
method (by a program consisting of a few pages), then one can recheck 
the statement locally, i.e., on a PC with one’s own personal proof-checker. 
Under these conditions of repeatability, one can trust the correctness of the 
statement at least as much as (or even more than) the safety of a bridge 
over which one is going to walk.
4-3. Formal CM system s
Systems of computer mathematics with portable proof-objects (as required 
by the quest for reliability discussed above) are to be done in a formal 
system T that should have the following properties.
• T is adequate: the usual mathematical concepts, statements and proofs 
can be expressed (in a natural way) formally in T. Adequacy requires 
the following particulars.
1. Adequacy for defining. The system T has sufficiently rich con­
cepts and allows the introduction of names.
2. Adequacy for reasoning. The usual logical deductions occurring 
in mathematics are representable as proof-objects of T .
3. Adequacy for computing. Symbolic (and numerical) computa­
tions, as well as equational reasoning, are possible in T.
• T is faithful: T is conservative in the sense that if it states that P 
is a proof of statement S (in context F), then the intuitive statement 
S is provable in ordinary mathematics relative to the corresponding 
context.
• T is efficient (for the machine): the verification of the well-formedness 
of a definition and the correctness of a proof can be verified in a feasible 
way.
• T is practical (for the human user): writing mathematics in T is not 
much more difficult than writing it in informal language.
Following the ideas in the languages of the Automatli family, now a wide 
spectrum of type theory systems are used as formal system T. See Nederpelt 
et al. [14], 229-247 for a discussion. The simplest of these are called Pure 
Type Systems (PTSs), see Barendregt [1], Under influence of D. Scott and 
P. Martin-Lof inductive types and extra reduction rules are added to the
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formal systems. The resulting extensions are called Type Systems (TSs). 
See Martin-Löf [10] and Paulin-Mohring [16] for a description of these.
Type theories are formal systems in which there is a natural way to re­
present statements and proofs. In fact, it seems more natural to encode 
mathematics in these systems than in the more conventional set theory. 
The reason is, that type theory has a natural way to use many-sorted logic 
(in order to deal with structures like vector spaces, in wliicli there are vectors 
and scalars belonging to different ‘sorts’), as well as to formalize second and 
higher order logic (to reason about properties of propositions, or properties 
of properties of propositions; in this way one can formulate the notion of ‘in­
finite’). To make a variation on a statement of Laplace, we can say that ‘we 
do not need the hypotheses of set theory’. (Napoleon remarked to Laplace 
that in liis work ‘Mecanique Celeste’ he did not mention the author of the 
universe. Laplace answered: ‘Sire, I did not need that hypothesis’.) More­
over, set theory sometimes gives rise to unnatural questions, for example 
0€\/2? In type theory such questions cannot be formulated.
One important aspect of (P)TSs is that some proof steps (of defini­
tional nature) do not need to be given explicitly. Suppose we have proved 
Pi&P2=>Q. Now define P = P1 &P2 . Then we have, of course, P=>Q. In 
a (P)TS the same prool-object for P ih P ^ Q  works also for P=>Q. This 
P and P 1 &P2 are said to be definitionally equal and share the same in­
habitants (by a rule of PTSs). In TSs more equalities hold in this way. 
For example there exists a term Sq (for squaring), such that for a natural 
number like 3 one has Sq (3) = 9 definition ally. So a proof of A(9) is also a 
proof of A(Sq(3)). This is the essential difference between TSs and PTSs.
Now we will discuss how the list of requirements applies to type theories.
1(a). As was already mentioned, type theories are strong enough to re­
present most mathematical reasoning. In addition to this adequacy, the 
extra data types available in TSs make representations easier in these sys­
tems. It is known also in programming that extra data types make life 
much easier. Surprisingly many concepts in mathematics are related to 
inductively defined data types (for example the notion of polynomial).
1(b). Although proofs of most tautologies (syllogisms) of predicate logic, 
that are needed in mathematics as deduction steps, can be found auto­
matically by resolution methods, this does not mean that the problem of 
formalising logical steps is solved. The reason is that one needs names in 
mathematics. Now even if
naniei =>• naniea
is a tautology, this is so, only after the names are replaced by the proper 
expression they stand for. This so-called ‘unfolding’ should not be done 
fully, because then the expressions become unfeasibly large. So the problem 
boils down to deciding what names have to be unfolded.
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Each statement A of informal (but precise) mathematics can be trans­
lated as a formal statement (A) in logic. A mathematical context F 
consists of a set of axioms and definitions. When we write these for­
mally, we obtain a formal context (r). Predicate logic is such that we 
can derive (A) from (F) exactly when A is informally provable from F.
Type theory goes one step further. A statement A is transformed 
into the type (i.e., collection)
[A] = tlie set of proofs of A.
So A is provable if and only if [A] is ‘inhabited’ by a proof p. Now a 
proof of A=>B consists (according to the Brouwer-Fteyting interpretation 
of implication) of a function having as argument a proof of A and as value 
a proof of B. In symbols
[A^B] = [A] -  [B].
Similarly
[VxeA.Px] =  Ux: A.[Px\,
where ILctAfPa;] is the cartesian product of the [Px], because a proof 
of 'ix&A.Px consists of a function that assigns to each element xEA 
a proof of Px. Using this interpretation a proof of My^A.Py^-Py is 
Xy.AXx:Py.x. Here Ax:A.B(x) denotes the function that assigns to input 
xEA the output B{x).
Verifying whether p is a proof of [A], boils down to verifying whether 
in the given context the type of p is equal to [A],
Figure 5. The essence of proof-checking.
1(c). Equational reasoning is not yet incorporated in a feasible way in 
TSs. Systems of CA can produce valid equations. Several ways of doing 
this in CM systems are being studied: the believing way, in which the CM 
system just accepts equations produced by a CA system; the skeptic, in 
which tlie CA system is forced to give evidence (a proof-object) for each 
statement it sends to the CM system; and finally the autarkic way, in which 
the CM system learns to do equational reasoning by incorporating some 
verified term rewriting techniques.
2. Unfortunately faithfulness is only known for several adequate PTSs ancl 
not for the corresponding more practical TSs. It is conjectured, however, 
that the right TSs are faithful.
3. As to efficiency, both for the PTSs and the TSs correctness is decidable 
by a simple program. But the verification is in general not feasible in these 
systems. It is, however, an empirical fact, that if formal definitions and
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proofs in these type theories come from definitions and proofs understood 
by a human, then the verification of correctness is feasible.
4. Even the stronger TSs are not yet practical. What is needed, is a kind 
of higher language (in the sense that FORTRAN and PASCAL are higher 
programming languages than assembler) that is convenient to express math­
ematics but that can be translated easily to the more low-level language of 
(P)TSs. Such a language is called by De Bruijn a m.athematical vernacular,
4-4■ Implementations
The first prototype CM system was the Automath proof-checker built in 
1970, see Nederpelt et al. [1994], pp. 783-804. In this system the proof- 
object had to be constructed by hand. It required a mathematical monk 
to formalise a non-trivial part of mathematics. In the second generation 
prototypes the proof-objects are generated via so-called tactics. A tactic 
is a sequence of commands that the user can give to the system; from this 
a proof-object can be compiled automatically. Suppose, for example, that 
one has to create a formal proof for
Vx,y£A[P{x,y)=>Q(x)] (+)
(the ‘goal’) from a certain context. Then one ‘pushes a button’ and the 
system adds to the context that x,y£A  and the assumption P(x,y). Now 
the goal is to prove Q(x) from the extended context. As soon as this is 
done the system provides a proof for (+). See figure 6 for an example of 
tactics. Not shown are the answers of the system after each statement made 
by the user. These answers consists of new (simpler) goals—as described 
above—so that the human does not get lost while designing the proof of 
(+)•
These tactics do not constitute a vernacular because they are close to tlie 
syntactical structure of the formal proof, rather than to the mathematical 
idea of the informal proof.
4-5. Existing systems
The principal second generation prototype systems for CM with portable 
proof-objects are NuPrl (see Constable et al. [5]), Coq (see Dowek et al. 
[7]), and LEGO (see Luo et al. [9]). These systems have as extra features:
• tactics.
• term rewriting.
• (some form of) automated deduction.
Tactics make it much easier for the human user to construct a proof- 
object. NuPrl was the first system based 011 type theory using tactics. 
Many theorems are proved using it.
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(❖Theorem Drinkers'.principle.*)
Goal ({P:Prop> P \/ ~P) ~>
{Cafe : Type} {w:Cafe} {Drunk : Cafe -> Prop}
Ex [x : Cafe] (Drunk x) -> {x:Cafe} Drunk x; 
intros E M __ ;
Refine EM ({x:Cafe} Drunk x);
Intros Refine Exlntro; Refine w; 
intros Immed;
intros; Refine EM (Ex [x:Cafe] "(Drunk x));
intros; Refine HI; intros; Refine Exlntro; Refine t;
intros _; Refine H2 H3;
intros; Refine H;
intros; Refine EM (Drunk x);
intros; Immed;
intros; Refine HI;
Refine Exlntro; Refine x; Immed;
Save Drinkers’.principle;
Figure 6. Tactics.
Incorporation of term-rewriting makes it easier to deal with symbolic and 
other forms of computation. In particular the autarkic way of incorporating 
CA can make use of this facility.
Automated deduction based on resolution solves some of the logical steps 
to be made. As pointed out before, diligent use of unfolding definitions 
is necessary. In some versions of Coq this can be done by ‘clicking’ 011 
the name. LEGO has some ‘automated’ unfolding, necessary for ease of 
use. One of tlie newer features of Coq is the automatic translation of a 
proof-object into a proof in natural language, see Coscoy et al. [6].
In figure 7 one can see for Smullyans ‘Drinkers’ principle’ an informal 
proof (in ‘my best mathematical style’), the proof-object, and finally a 
translation of that formal proof into natural language. The formal proof 
is obtained through an interactive session in which the user provides tactics 
to the machine, see figure 6.
Although the translated proofs in natural language are somewhat ‘stiff’, 
these may turn out to be useful for the construction of a vernacular. Tlie 
reason is that seeing a formal proof-object does not easily lead to under­
standing, while a proof in natural language does. In particular this is so, 
when sufficiently many details that are obvious to a human are elided.
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Sm ullyan’s ‘D rinkers’ principle’: in a room with people there always is at 
least one person, such that if  that person starts to drink, then everybody in  
the room starts to drink.
R.M. Smullyan
T h e o r e m ( D n n k e r s ’ p r in c ip io ]  Lot U b e  a  
n o n - e m p ty  so l a n d  le i  Q  b o  a  p r e d ic a to  
u n  V .  T h e n
3 x a J .[ Q ( z )  -  W U .Q i u ) } .
P ro o f .  W o d is t i n g u i s h  tw o  c ase s .
C a s e  1. V y .Q (y ) .  T h e n  a n  a r b i t r a r y  x(=U 
m a k e s  th e  im p l ic a t io n  t r u e .
C a s e  2 . - * y .Q { y ) .  T h e n  - ,g { * o )  fo r  
s o m e  . N ow  ta k e  x  — aro, tu  m a k e
t h e  im p l ic a t io n  v a c u o u s ly  t r u e .
Fig. 7a.
Theorem Drinkers' prlnclplo.
Slaiomonl
(VP: Prop. p v - , p ) s
VU: Set, U =» VO: U =9 Prop. 3x: U. {□ x) => VxD; U. (Q *0).
Prool
Xh1: VP: Prop. P v  P. XU: Sol. XH'O: U. Xq : U =» Prop.
VxO: U, (Q xO) ~,(VxO:U.(Q x0)) 3x; U. (Q x)=*Vx0:U.(O xO)
TtH'l: VkO: U. (Q xO).
(ox.Intro U Xx:U. (Q x) =» VxO: U. (0 xO) H’O XH'2: (Q M'O). H'l) 
Xll'1: ->(VxO: U.(Q xO)).
Bx: U. -i (Q x) -i(3x:U . -.(Q x)) 3x:U. (Q x)=»VxO:U. (0 xO) 
KH'2: 3k: U. -> (Q X}.
(oxjnd
U Jtx: U. —< (Q x) 3x: U. (Q x)-■> VxO: U. (Q xO)
Xx:U. XE: —i (Q x),
(ox Jnlro
U XxO:U. (Q xO) Vxl; U. (Q xl) x
Xh '3: (Q x). {Fnlsajnci VxO: U. (Q xO) (E H’3») H’2)
XH'2: - i (3x: U. --(Q x)).
(ox Inlro
U Xx: U, (Q x) ^  VxO: U. (0 xO) H'O 
XH’3; (0 H'O). Xx: U.
(orjnd
(0 x) —. (Q x) (Q x) XH’4:(Q x). H'4 
XH'4: - i (Q x).
(FalBo .Ind (Q x) (H'2 (oxJMro U XxO:U.-i(Q xO) x H’4))) 
(I!1 (0 x)))) (H' 3x:U. —i (Q x))) (H' VxO: U. (Q xO))).
Fig. 7b.
Thoorom Drlnkors' principio 
Siaiomont
(VP: Prop. Pv-iP)=>
VU: Sol. U => VQ: U Prop. 3x: Ü. (Q x) => VxO: U. (Q xO).
Prool
Assumi» VP: Prop. P v -, P (H )
Lui U bu n col
Conaldnranoibilraryolomoni H'O in li 
Lol Q . U =* Prop
Spoclnlizing I I lo VxO: U. (0 xO). woqqI 
(VxO: U. IO xO)) v  -, (VxO: U. (Q xO))
So wo liavo two cusos :
a) A9Siimo VxO: U. (Q xO) (H I)
Assumo (Q H'O) IHUI 
Wohavo M I 
Wg davo provod (Q H’O) ^  VxD: U. (Q xO)
Wd Imvd iound nn oloinonl x ihul vanita (0 x) ~i VxO: U. (0 >0), 
nnmuly H'O
b) Assumo -i (VxO: U. (0 >0)) (H I)
Spociallzmg H’ lo 3»: U. -i (Q x), woqqi 
{*ix: U. --.(Q x)) v -i (3x: U. -.(Q x))
So wo hnvo Iwo cmos 
n) Assumo 3x: U. -i (Q x) (M S)
Choosoanolnmonl x in U sucM (hai ■ (Q x) (E)
Assuma (O k) (H 3)
Rom H'3 anrl E, wo (Induca a conlrtiUidion 
Su. Iliis caso cnnnol hnppon 
Wo hnvo provaci (0 x) =» VxO: U, (Q xO)
WohavolountJan olomonl xO lliatvorilioo 
(Q xO) - í  Vxl: U. (Q xl), namoly x 
b) Assumo —> (3x: U. - ,(0  x)) (h ?j 
Assumo (Q H O) (113)
Consiclor nn orbiimiy olomonl x in U
Spocinliiinfl H' lo (O x), wo gol (0 x) v -i (0 x) 
So wo hnvo Iwo cnsos : 
a) Assumo (O x) (H'4f 
Woluivn H 'I 
t») Assumo -, (O x) (H'4|
Wohnvo H'4
Wo liavo found an olomonl xO ihntvandOB 
-, (0 xO), nnmoly x 
go. Irom H‘2, wododuco n rontrncliction 
So. Itila coso conno! huppon 
Wo liavo (Q x) in bolli cosos 
Wo hnvo prnvod (0 H'O) Vx: U. (Q x)
Wo luivu IouikJ an olomonl x that vonlios 
(0 x) => VxO: U. (0 xO). namoly H'O 
Wo hnvo 3x: U. (Q x) =» VxO: U. (Q xO) in boih cnsos 
Wo iwvo 3x: U. (0 x) VxO: U. (Q xO) ir» botti cnsos 
Wo Iibvo provai)
(VP: Prop. P v - , P) =?
VII: Sol. Il =? VO: U =» Prop. Ux: U. (0 x) => VxO: U. (Q xO).
Hg. 7c:.
Figure 7. Various forms of proofs of Smullyan's 'Drinkers’ principle': a. the informal 
proof; b. the proof-object; c. the proof-object translated back into natural language.
H.P. Barendregt
4-6. Related work
There are several system s for C'M based 011 a different methodology. Not 
all of these have po rtab le  proof-objects, and therefore one has to  believe in 
their design. Nevertheless, these system s are ra ther interesting.
A system  of CM based on some form  of TS, bu t w ithout proof-objects is 
Isabelle, see Paulson [17]. This system  has a  good module for term  rewriting, 
which is im portan t for equational reasoning.
System s of CM no t based on T Ss are HOL, see Gordon et al. [8], the 
Boyer-More theorem  prover, see Boyer et al. [3], O TTER , see Wos et al. 
[21], and MIZAR, see Rudm cki [20]. HOL is based on higher order logic and 
lias been used for hardw are verification. The Boyer-More theorem prover 
is based on a form al system  called prim itive recursive arithmetic (PRA). 
Because this system  is relatively w eak—it has no quantifiers and only states 
universal propositions—th ere  are m ore strategies for autom ated proof search 
for PR A , th an  for th e  stronger theories. OTTER, is based on the resolution 
m ethod and is able to  find m any proofs of tautologies in predicate logic used 
in in tu itive m athem atical proofs. M IZAR is based on set theory formulated 
in predicate logic. M any theorem s have been proved in this system.
5. C o n c l u s i o n
Systems for com puter m athem atics are very promising. Nevertheless, p re­
sently they  still have some weak points. There is a need for a good vernac­
ular to  make formalising m ore n a tu ra l; there is a  need for a good way to  
handle symbolic com putations; an d  finally for the TSs used one needs to  
prove the faithfulness for th e  formalisations.
I expect, th a t w ithin a decade systems for CM are more mature. I 11 
particular they will include (or use) the power of systems for CA to deal 
w ith equations. T hen  CM will be essentially stronger than  CA, because 
of th e  fact th a t sta tem ents can be proved. (Working w ith CA systems one 
may overlook necessary side-conditions.) Two interesting uses are probable. 
One in  the field of in teractive development of m athem atics and one in the  
field of software design.
The interactive developm ent of m athem atics does not imply ‘Death of 
proof’ or the  end of hum an involvement w ith m athem atics, as some have 
claimed. On the  contrary, b o th  proofs and the ingenuity of the user will play 
an essential role in  com puter m athem atics and its applications. Proofs are 
essential, because w ithout them  th e re  is 110 w arranted correctness; humans 
are essential, because otherwise proofs cannot be found.
T he lim ited experience w ith  CM  systems has shown th a t the phase of 
defining concepts is very essential. Once sufficient experience is obtained 
w ith handling com plicated notions, I expect applications to specification 
and correctness of software system s. A necessary condition is, th a t software 
is w ritten  in a m odular way, as is possible in e.g. functional languages. Some
The Q uest for C orrectness
researchers express doubts, th a t the  design methodology of tlie  Chinese box 
w ill be sufficient to produce correct software. They do believe, however, in 
program  extraction from verified proofs. In any case, precise specifications 
ancl proofs will be im portant.
Acknowledgements
I  th a n k  the following persons for useful information: G. B arthe , M. Bezem, 
R. Boyer, A. Cohen, R. Constable, H. Elbers, H. Geuvers, G. Huet, H. Mei- 
je r, R. Plasmeijer, R. Platek, R. Pollack, M. Ruys, F. Vaandrager and
H. W upper.
R e f e r e n c e s
I. H .P . B a r e n d r e g t  (1992). Typed Lam bda calculi. S. A b r a m s k y  e t  
AL. (eds.). Handbook of Logic in Computer Science, Oxford University 
Press, 117-309.
2. H .P . B a r e n d r e g t , T. N i p k o w  (eds.) (1994). Types for Proofs and 
Program s, Lecture Notes in Com puter Science, 806, Springer, Berlin.
3. R .S . B o y e r , J.S . M o o r e  (1988). A computational logic, Academic 
Press, New York.
4. A. B u n d y  (ed.) (1994). A utom ated Deduction—CADE-12, Lecture 
Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 814, Springer, Berlin.
5. R . C o n s t a b l e , e t  a l . (1986). Implementing M athematics with the 
NuPrl Proof Development System , Prentice Hall, London.
6. Y . C'OSCOY, G. K a h n , L. T i-i e r y  (1995). Extracting te x t from proofs, 
in: M. D e z a n i - C i a n c a g l i n i  (eds.). Typed Lambda Calculus and A p ­
plications, Lecture Notes in Com puter Science 9Ü2, Springer, Berlin, 
109-123.
7. G . DOWEK, ET AL. (1993). The Coq Proof A ssistant U ser’s Guide 
Version 5.8. P rojet Formel, INRIA, Rocquencourt.
8. M .J .C . G o r d o n , T .F . M e l h a m  (1993). Introduction to HOL: a theo­
rem proving environment fo r  higher order logic, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
9. Z. L uo, R . P o l l a c k  (1992). LEGO proof development system: User’s 
m anual, Technical Report ECS-LFCS-92-2'11, C om puter Science De­
partm ent, University of Edinburgh.
10. P . MARTIN-LÓF (1984). Intuitionistic. Type Theory, Studies in Proof 
Theory, Bibliopolis, Napoli.
11. J. M c C a r t h y  (1962). Com puter Program s for Checking M athem atical 
Proofs, in: Recursive Function Theory, Proceedings o f a Symposium in 
Pure Mathematics, V, American M athem atical Society, Providence, RI, 
219-227.
H.P. B arendregt
12. T .F .  M eli-i a m , J . C a m i l l e r i  (eds.) (1994). Higher Order Logic The­
orem Proving and its Application, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
859, Springer, Berlin.
13. R . M u s il  (1952). Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, Rowohlt, Hamburg.
14. R .P . N e d e r p e l t , J.H . G e u v e r s , R .C . d e  V r u e r  (eds.) (1994). 
Selected Papers on Autom ath, Studies in Logic 133, Nortlr-Holland, 
Am sterdam .
15. C . P a r e n t  (1994). Certified programs in the  system Coq—The pro­
gram  tactic, in: [2], 291-312.
16. C . P a u l i n - M o h r j n g  (1993). Inductive Definitions in the Sytem Coq— 
Rules and Properties, in: M . B e z e m  e t  a l . (eds.). Typed Lambda 
Calculus and Applications, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 664, 
Springer, Berlin, 328-345.
17. L. P a u l s o n  (1994). Isabelle: A  generic theorem prover. Lecture Notes 
in Com puter Science 828, Springer, Berlin.
18. R . P l a s m e i j e r , M . van E e k e l e n  (1993). Functional Programming 
and Parallel Graph Rewriting, Addison Wesley, New York.
19. D . F o u n t a i n , (1994). Functional programming comes of age, in: Byte, 
183-184.
20. P . R u d n i c k i  (1992). An overview of the MIZAR project. Available by 
anonymous F T P  from
m e u a ik .c s .u a lb e r ta .c a  as p u b / M i z a r / M i z a r _ O v e r . t a r . Z .
21. L. W os, R. O v e r b e e k , R. L u s k , J. B o y l e  (1992). Automated R.ea- 
soning: Introduction and Applications, McGraw-Hill, New York.
